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Following concerns for players safety, the National Football League (NFL) chose to protect 
the quarterbacks (QB) further by changing the “roughing the passer rule” in 2018. This paper 
studies the effect this rule change had on QB salaries. This is done by applying a Difference-
in-Differences approach on salary data stretching from 2013 to 2021. Our estimate show how 
the salary increase following the rule change around 900 thousand dollars when excluding 
bonuses, while the actual increase reach 1.2 million dollars. Considering the wages for the 
top 30 percent of QBs, we find an increase of actual spending approximately reaching 3 
million dollars, while for the top five percent the increase of actual spending lies at around 
1.3 million dollars. Controlling for time trends gave us answer similar to our original DID 
approach, but our robustness checks gave us treatment effects similar to the ones from our 
DID approach. We conclude that since there are treatment effects, even when there are no 
treatment, we cannot accurately state that it is the rule change that creates the treatment 
effect.  
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1. Introduction  
In 2018 The National Football League (NFL) introduced a change in the “roughing the 
passer rule”. The “rouching the passer rule” is referred to as RULE 12 SECTION 2 
ARTICLE 11 in the NFL rulebook and will be referred to as RTP (Operations, 2018). The 
original rule (from 1995), stated that: “a defensive player is prohibited from unnecessarily 
and violently throwing him down and landing on top of him with all or most of the defenders 
weight.” The update (implemented in the 2018 season), stated that: “a defensive player is 
prohibited from unnecessarily and violently throwing him down or landing on top of him 
with all or most of the defenders weight.” The defenders job is to prevent the quarterback 
(QB) from throwing the ball and this is done by “sacking” the QB, so changing the rules 
makes it harder for the defender to “sack” the QB.   
The change from and to or is a small one, but the consequences were huge. In 2020 there 
was an average of 3.97 RTP-penalties called for each of the 32 teams, while in 2019 there 
was an average of 4.25 RTP-penalties. However, back in 2016 the average were down at 2.78 
RTP-penalties (NFL Penalties, 2020). The increased frequency, at which those penalties are 
enforced, is a good starting point.  
Our argument therefore becomes; since the penalties enforced as a result of this rule change 
has increased, would this imply that the job of the defenders becomes harder? And in the 
same sense, that the job of the QB has become easier? The aim of this paper is to draw a line 
between the increased success of the QB as a result of the changed RTP-rule, and the 
following increased salary of the QB.   
Furthermore, common knowledge assumes that QBs affect the game to a higher degree than 
other positions (Schalter, 2013). This assumption leads to the conclusion that the upper level 
of players in the NFL are QBs, while the rest of the players are at the level below. This paper 
will try to expand on this knowledge, and furthermore say that the salary of players in the 
NFL follow a certain Pareto distribution. The term is named after the famous economist 
Wilfredo Pareto, who insisted that in societal structures, workers with different set of skills 
earn different salaries, depending on how highly their skills were valued (Pareto, 1896). 
Going a step further, we will try to show the existence of this Pareto distribution in the NFL, 
while at the same time trying to show that the rule change further increased the gap between 






Researchers from the University of Hamburg had a useful summary comprising of the most 
important aspects of the contract negotiation between a team and a player (Heubeck, 2003). 
The salary for a given player consists of three parts; 
(1) signing bonuses – these are payments set in place for a player when signing a new 
contract. If the team chooses to terminate the contract, this payment is still guaranteed to the 
player.  
(2) fixed payments – this part of the salary is a yearly payment given to the player, and 
usually count against the teams Salary Cap. The Salary Cap is a cap that is set by the league. 
This cap determines how much each team is allowed to spend on salaries, and is meant to 
create a level playing field between different teams.  
(3) performance bonuses – incentives based on either personal performance or team 
performance.   
One important note to labor economics is the existence of collective bargaining between 
owners and unions. With the latter seeking an acceptable wage for its members, while the 
firms have an incentive to depreciate the value the union sets forward. The most commonly 
known model for evaluating collective bargaining, is referred to as the “right-to-manage” 
model (Cahuc, 2014). This is also applicable to the NFL, where the union for players is called 
the National Football League Players Association. The NFLPA acts on behalf of the players 
when it comes to bargain over the collective bargaining agreement or CBA. The last CBA 
was implemented before the 2020 season of the NFL(NFLPA, 2020 ).  
While we are not interested in the contract negotiation, it still seems important to note as it is 
a prerequisite to the contracts negotiated.  
 
2.1 Previous literature  
The NFL has been a research subject for economists in a few years now, and sports 
economists have chosen this subject as it translates well into other parts of society.  
In 2019 two researchers from the University of Pennsylvania research how teams could better 
allocate the money they had available to them (Mulholland & Jensen, 2019). Mulholland and 
Jensen found that teams who chose to draft players that would have an immediate impact on 
the team’s performance, had allocated their money in the best manner. This relates well to 





Another important research paper stems from Michael A. Roach from Middle Tennessee 
State University, in which the researcher tests the NFL for labor market efficiency with 
specific position groups (Roach, 2017). The researcher ends up concluding that the teams  
choosing to spend more money on the offensive side of the ball, mainly QBs and offensive 
line (the ones who protect the QB) will earn the highest value for their money.  
Both articles provide similarities to our intuition, which is that teams who choose to spend 
more money on QBs, will in return receive the highest value from their spending.  
2.2 Distribution of wealth in the NFL  
We center our research behind the assumption that QBs will become more valuable as the 
rule change is in their favor. But is there already some sort of disparity between athletes in 
the NFL? If there is, a summary of this Pareto distribution will prove useful.  
 
 
Figure 1: Projected and actual distribution of money for all players. 
Notes on Figure 1: Cap Number and Cash Spend show dollars in millions on the y-axis, 
while the number of players are listed on the x-axis.  
Figure 1 shows us how there is a few top earners in the league, while the average amount of 
players lies below. Cap Number is the amount of money that counts against said year Salary 
Cap, while Cash Spent reveal what the salary of a certain player actually was. Deciding how 
much goes against the Salary Cap, is down to the individual team, and given the fact that 
bonuses heavily influence the actual cash given out to a player, Cash Spent is almost always 
larger than Cap Number. It goes the other way around too; if a player is injured, Cap Number 
stays the same, while Cash Spent decreases. 
While it is interesting to check for Pareto distribution among all players in the NFL, we think 
that for our thesis, it would be more interesting to look at QBs alone. We do this by creating 
three different Pareto distributions, one for all QBs, the next one for the top 30 percent and 




example the 286 highest Cap Numbers out of 954 QB observations for Cap Number. The rest 
of the figures follows this same notion.   
 
 
Figure 2: Projected and actual distribution of money for QBs. 
 
Figure 3: Projected and actual distribution of money for the top 30 percent of QBs. 
 
Figure 4: Projected and actual distribution of money for the top five percent of QBs. 
Notes on Figure 2, 3 and 4: Cap Number and Cash Spend show dollars in millions on the y-
axis, while the number of QBs are listed on the x-axis. 
In the figures above, the notion we implied earlier still sticks. The Pareto distribution still 
exists, and this would further imply that even among the QBs themselves there is some 
degree of salary dispersion.  




effects between the rule change and increasing salary for QBs, but it also enables us to check 
if the increase in salary applies to the highest earners among all QBs.  
 
Going back to the research question and introducing the hypotheses that will be tested: 
How did changing the “rouching the passer rule” in 2018 affect salaries for quarterbacks in 
the NFL?  



























3. Method   
3.1 Data collection  
To investigate if there exits causal effects between the rule change and the following increase 
in salaries for QBs, information about teams Cap Number and Cash Spent would prove 
useful. Achieving this was done by the use of web scraping from an open source called 
“overthecap.com” (PS, 2021).  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the data. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Max 
Cap Number 21,372 1,961,271 3,219,914 37,202,000 
Cash Spent 21,372 2,136,586 3,837,446 75,000,000 
Salary Cap 21,372 164,498,844 24,100,096 198,200,000 
 
Notes on Table 1: Summary of important numerical variables in our data set. Scraping 
players specific data stretching from 2013 to 2021, allows us to end up with a large sample of 
players. The numbers are listed in dollars. Binary variables such as QB and RI were left out 
of our descriptive statistics.  
QB is our first indicator variable; it takes the value one for all observations that are QBs and 
zero otherwise. The correlation in both instances (Cap Number and Cash Spent) with regards 
to the binary variable QB, shows a low degree of correlation (0,18 and 0,17). RI is the next 
dummy variable. This variable will be equal to one for all observations after 2018 and zero 
before 2018. Additionally, we included a numerical variable for “year”. 
We conclude that the data is comprised as a panel, however an unbalanced panel. The 
prerequisite for doing a Difference-in-Differences analysis, does not hinge on the panel data 
being balanced, but on the fact that there is a clear intervention and a result following that 
intervention. We therefore feel comfortable continuing our process with this data.  
3.2 Difference-in-Differences  
Difference-in-Differences, or DID, is a research method that allows us to check for causality 
between an intervention and what that intervention entails for the group affected (Hill et al., 
2018). For our purposes, DID will be used to prove that the rule change is the main driver 
behind the increasing salary for QBs.  
Our experiment assumes that the Treatment group will be QBs, while all the other players 




We choose to create two regression equations; one with Cap Number as the dependent 
variable, and one with Cash Spent. The causal effects or Treatment effect estimated by DID 
will be noted as the 𝛿-coefficient, and this coefficient shows the change that occurs when the 
rule is implemented. This coefficient is the interaction between the independent variables QB 
and RI. Both equations and the proof of why the 𝛿-coefficient is the one for inference about 
the change induced from the rule change, can be found in the Appendix (as equation (1) and 
(2)).  
We also want to prove that DID could be estimated using sample means. Using sample means 
to estimate the 𝛿-coefficient was introduced by David Card and Alan B. Krueger, in their 
paper concerning minimum wages in both Pennsylvania and New Jersey (Card & Krueger, 
2000).  
When creating sample means, we first need to add some definitions:  
𝒀 = Our outcome variable (either for Cap Number or Cash Spent) 
After defining Y as our outcome variable, we will use four different sample means for finding 
the 𝛿-coefficient:  
𝒀𝑻𝑩 = Sample mean of Y for the Treatment group, before intervention. 
𝒀𝑻𝑨 = Sample mean of Y for the Treatment group, after intervention. 
𝒀𝑪𝑩 = Sample mean of Y for the Control group, before intervention. 
𝒀𝑪𝑨 = Sample mean of Y for the Control group, after intervention. 
Creating the sample means for both the Treatment- and Control group, allows us to create 
two equations for finding the 𝛿-coefficient for both Cap Number and Cash Spent:  
 
𝜹𝑪𝒂𝒑𝑵𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 = [(𝑌𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑁 − 𝑌𝐶𝐴𝐶𝑁) − (𝑌𝑇𝐵𝐶𝑁 − 𝑌𝐶𝐵𝐶𝑁)] (3) 
𝜹𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒉𝑺𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒕 = [(𝑌𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑆 − 𝑌𝐶𝐴𝐶𝑆) − (𝑌𝑇𝐵𝐶𝑆 − 𝑌𝐶𝐵𝐶𝑆)] (4) 
 
In addition to finding the mean values for DID, we also want to prove our results really stem 
from the rule change in 2018. We do this by implementing a Placebo test that lets us check 
whether or not a false rule change implemented in either 2017 or 2019, gives significant 
results. The last thing we do is to check if the salary of the top percent of QBs act in the same 
way as QBs altogether. We do this by first checking for the top 30 percent of QBs and at the 
end checking for the top five percent of QBs. Additionally, we introduce a time trend for both 
the Treatment- and Control groups. This time trend will be further used to control the answers 




4. Results  
4.1 Time trend  
Before estimating DID, we want to check for a time trend by using the variable “year”, on the 
effects for both Cap Number and Cash Spent. This is done by applying creating sample 
means of Cap Number and Cash Spent for both the Treatment- and Control groups:    
 
Figure 5: Time trends for the Treatment- and Control group with Cap Number as the dependent variable.  
 
Figure 6: Time trends for Treatment and Control group with Cash Spent as the dependent variable. 
 
Notes on Figure 5 and 6: Cap Number and Cash Spent show dollars in millions on the y-
axis, while the years are pictured on the x-axis.  
There is clearly a difference in trend for the Treatment- and Control group. The is a higher 
acceleration in increasing Cap Number and Cash Spent for the Treatment group than the 
Control group. Additionally; the increase from 2017 to 2018 for the Treatment group, makes 
us vary of finding significant results for Treatment effects stemming from the 2018 rule 
change.  
Economists tends to use time trend to show that without the intervention, both the Treatment 
group and the Control group acts in a similar way. Though, this is not a prerequisite, as we 
already mentioned that there are underlying differences between those who play QB and 
those who do not. Later in the results section, we will show how controlling for time trends 




4.2 Results DID  
Table 2: Regression output for DID. 
Differences-in-Difference 
 Dependent variable: 
 Cap Number Cash Spent 
 (1) (2) 
QB 2,465,662*** 2,670,573*** 
 (140,817) (168,197) 
RI 433,328*** 478,992*** 
 (44,306) (52,921) 
QB*RI 897,399*** 1,208,367*** 
 (210,119) (250,976) 
Constant 1,634,213*** 1,773,181*** 
 (30,043) (35,885) 
Observations 21,372 21,372 
Adjusted R2 0 0 




Notes on Table 2: Standard errors are in parenthesis and “QB*RI” explains the 𝛿-coefficient. 
The low adjusted R2 indicates that there is a lot of unexpected variance in our variables. 
However, we still feel comfortable saying that there is a significant value for change in QB 
salaries, as a result of the rule change.   
The result is; teams plan to spend 897,399 dollars more on QBs after the rule change, but 
they actually spend 1,208,367 dollars more on QBs as a result of the rule changing. This 
means that our hypotheses surrounding QBs checks out, and now we will go on to further 










4.3 Visualization of the results  
Often it is easier to understand results, if we are shown visuals of them. Using this notion, we 
choose to present the Treatment, Control and the Counterfactual Treatment in two figures. 
The Counterfactual Treatment is an estimation using the trend of the Control group, with the 
same starting point as the Treatment group. We will use these notations in our visualization:  
• TA = Treatment After Intervention  
• TB = Treatment Before Intervention  
• CA = Control After Intervention  
• CB = Control Before Intervention  
• CTA = Counterfactual Treatment After Intervention  
 
 





Figure 8: Visualization of DID for Cash Spent. 
 
Notes on figure 7 and 8: Cap Number and Cash Spend show dollars in millions on the y-
axis, while intervention emulates the period before and after the rule is implemented, hence 0 
is before and 1 is after. In Figure 7 the difference between TA and CTA is the 𝛿-coefficient 
(897,399), while in Figure 8 the same notion applies (1,208,367).   
Showing visuals allows us to see the Treatment effect (𝛿) better. It shows that the difference 
between the end of Treatment (TA) and end of Control (CA) is not the difference we are 
looking for. This is because the underlying differences between the Treatment- and Control 
group are not accounted for here. Instead, using the Counterfactual Treatment (CTA), we find 
the true Treatment effect (𝛿). In other words, using the difference between TA and CTA 












4.4 Results using sample means 
Another way of proving the DID, is using sample means before and after the rule change.  
Table 3: Sample means for Cap Number and Cash Spent. 
Variable Mean Cap Number Mean Cash Spent 
Treatment After 5,430,602 6,131,114 
Treatment Before 4,099,875 4,443,754 
Control After 2,067,541 2,252,173 
Control Before 1,634,213 1,773,181 
𝛿 897,399 1,208,367 
 
Notes on Table 3: Sample means for Cap Number and Cash Spent in dollars. In addition to 
the mean values, we choose to include the Treatment effect (𝛿), we arrive at if we use 
equation 3 and 4 from the method part of the article.   
Using sample means is a way of showing the same as with our DID-regression:  
 
𝜹𝑪𝒂𝒑𝑵𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 = [(𝑌𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑁 − 𝑌𝐶𝐴𝐶𝑁) − (𝑌𝑇𝐵𝐶𝑁 − 𝑌𝐶𝐵𝐶𝑁)]




𝜹𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒉𝑺𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒕 = [(𝑌𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑆 − 𝑌𝐶𝐴𝐶𝑆) − (𝑌𝑇𝐵𝐶𝑆 − 𝑌𝐶𝐵𝐶𝑆)] 
𝜹𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒉𝑺𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒕 =  [(6,313,111 − 2,252,173) − (4,443,754 − 1,773,181)]
 𝜹𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒉𝑺𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒕 = 1,298,367
(4) 
Notes on equation 1 and 2: We simply inserted the actual sample means from our data. By 
using the same equations as presented in the method section, we arrive at the same values for 








4.5 Controlling for time trends, top 30 & five percent of QBs and robustness checks  
We previously mentioned the existence of an increasing time trend for Cap Number and Cash 
Spent. Adding the time trend to our regression, allows us to control our 𝛿-coefficient with 
regards to said time trend. In addition to this we wanted to check the same coefficient for the 
top 30 and five percent of QBs, and at last checking for robustness by implementing false 
rule changes in 2017 and 2019. The equations used to estimate these coefficients can be 
found in the Appendix.  
Table 4: Regression output for Cap Number. 
 Dependent variable: 
 Cap Number 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
QB 2,473,682*** 10,638,205*** 22,077,647*** 2,302,324*** 2,704,307*** 
 (140,746) (243,089) (893,608) (157,684) (129,098) 
RI 59,342 433,328*** 433,328***   
 (86,550) (41,388) (39,663)   
QB*RI 886,166*** 2,318,999*** 2,357,645**   
 (210,012) (351,326) (1,007,477)   
RI17    404,408***  
    (44,697)  
QB*RI17    1,014,540***  
    (210,620)  
RI19     451,911*** 
     (46,499) 
QB*RI19     463,537** 
     (220,162) 
Constant -171,205,740*** 1,634,213*** 1,634,213*** 1,600,312*** 1,677,836*** 
 (34,368,327) (28,065) (26,894) (33,938) (27,286) 
Observations 21,372 20,704 20,465 21,372 21,372 
Note: *p**p***p<0.01 
 
Note on the regressions: Standard errors are in parentheses. (1) Control for time trend, (2) 
Top 30 percent, (3) Top five percent, (4) Robust check for 2017 and (5) Robust check for 
2019. In addition to this, we chose to leave out the variable “year” from the output in Table 4.  
Table 4 gives us an answer to central difficulties that arises when estimating DID. The 
planned salary for estimates (2) and (3) is more or less the same. This indicates that whether 




change only increased their salary with a little over 2.3 million dollars. However, as 
presumed when visualizing our time trend, we arrive at significant results from our 
robustness checks. If the rule change was implemented in 2017 (4), the increase in planned 
salaries for QBs would be around 950 thousand dollars, and a false implementation of the 
rule change in 2019 (5) would increase QBs planned salaries with around 500 thousand 
dollars. Though this is unfortunate, the speedy acceleration of planned QB salaries might 
explain this, and we will further discuss this in the discussion part of the paper.   
We now do the same for Cash Spent:  
Table 5: Regression output for Cash Spent. 
  
 Dependent variable: 
 Cash Spent 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
QB 2,677,035*** 11,890,572*** 32,151,247*** 2,687,692*** 2,994,650*** 
 (168,167) (293,740) (791,998) (188,428) (154,230) 
RI 177,682* 478,992*** 478,992***   
 (103,413) (49,846) (47,145)   
QB*RI 1,199,318*** 3,022,457*** 1,330,012   
 (250,928) (423,008) (1,008,544)   
RI17    446,975***  
    (53,412)  
QB*RI17    941,754***  
    (251,685)  
RI19     488,437*** 
     (55,551) 
QB*RI19     619,408** 
     (263,022) 
Constant -137,479,468*** 1,773,181*** 1,773,181*** 1,735,736*** 1,825,222*** 
 (41,064,245) (33,800) (31,968) (40,555) (32,598) 
Observations 21,372 20,704 20,465 21,372 21,372 
Note: *p**p***p<0.01 
 
Note on the regressions: Standard errors are in parentheses. The notation (1:5) is the same 
for Cash Spent as the ones for Cap Number.  
Table 5 show that for actual spending for the top 30 percent of players (2), we see that the 




around 1.3 million dollars for the top five percent (3). Again, we end up with significant 
results from our robustness checks. This time it actually shows that the increase from a false 
rule change in 2017 (4) is around 1 million dollars, while implementing a false rule change in 
2019 (5) gives an increase of 600 thousand dollars for QBs.  
For time trends (1) in both occasions (Cap Number and Cash Spent), we see that the results 
for the 𝛿-coefficient does not differ that much from the one we got without including the 





























5. Discussion  
What this paper sought out to do was ultimately to find out if there was any causality between 
the rule change and increasing salary for QBs. For our case, we found an increase in QB 
salaries when using 2018 as our intervention point.   
The trouble with drawing inference from the results, are that our results do not account for an 
increasing Salary Cap. Our results only find an increase in actual salary, not relative salary. In 
addition to this, our results have a low adjusted R2. This indicates that the scatter plot around 
our fitted regression line deviates a lot, but as we mentioned before, we did not set out to find 
variance in Cap Number or Cash Spent, and as we still find significant answers we are able to 
draw inference about our end results. Another unfortunate part of our research was found 
when doing our robustness checks and found a treatment effect, where there was no treatment 
(2017 and 2019). We find it reasonably to assume that this stems from the increasing 
acceleration of salaries for the Treatment group opposite to the slight increasing trend for the 
Control group.     
A positive note on our results is that we see that the Pareto distribution still holds after the 
rule change. Both for top 30 and five percent we see a higher increase in salary after the rule 
change for all our results, but one. This furthermore proves that the top percent of QBs have 
an increasing salary after the rule change.  
For researchers interested in this topic, a note to further research should be to control for an 
increasing Salary Cap. Controlling for Salary Cap would allow us to find answers about 
relative change in salaries stemming from the rule change. Additionally, the research would 
become more comprehensibly if there was implemented an econometric model for time series 
data with non-stationary data, as this would solve our problems with concluding that it is the 













6. Conclusion  
We started this paper by noticing how the NFL has changed in terms of penalties called for 
defenders committing a foul leading to a RTP-penalty enforced. Furthermore, we introduced 
a little bit of previous literature and the existence of a Pareto distribution in regards to all 
players, QBs and the top 30- and five percent of QBs. From there we went on to explain how 
we collected the data used for estimation, before explaining the process of DID-estimation. 
Second to last we presented our positive results, which further proved that our hypotheses 
was true. We then chose to control for time trend, the top 30- and five percent of QBs, and 
lastly robustness checks for 2017 and 2019.   
 
Going back to the research question:  
• How did changing the “roughing the passer rule” in 2018 affect salaries for 
quarterbacks in the NFL?  
 
Finding treatment effects where no intervention was implemented means we cannot 
decisively say that it was the rule change that drove QB salaries further up. However, what 
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8. Appendix  
8.1 Main regression  
Explanation of the variables:  
𝐘𝐂𝐚𝐩𝐍𝐮𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫: Indicates how much money a team intends to spend on a player for a given year. 
𝒀𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒉𝑺𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒕: Indicates how much money a team actually spent on a player for a given year. 
𝑸𝑩: Dummy variable. Indicates whether we are looking at the Treatment- or Control group. 
(QB = 1 for the Treatment group, QB=0, for the Control group) 
𝑹𝑰: Dummy variable. Indicates whether we are before or after intervention. (RI = 1 after the 
rule change, RI = 0 before the rule change) 
𝜹: The Difference-in-Differences estimator, explained by the Difference-in-Differences 
matrix below. 
The two regressions:  
𝑌𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑄𝐵 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐼 + 𝛿(𝑄𝐵 ∗ 𝑅𝐼) + 𝜖 (1) 
𝑌𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑄𝐵 +  𝛽2𝑅𝐼 + 𝛿(𝑄𝐵 ∗ 𝑅𝐼) + 𝜖 (2) 
Difference-in-Differences matrix:  
 QB = 1 QB = 0 Change 
R-I = 1 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛿 𝛽0 + 𝛽2 𝛽1 + 𝛿 
R-I = 0 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝛽0  𝛽1 
Change 𝛽2 + 𝛿 𝛽2 𝛿 
 
How we end up with 𝜹 being the coefficient that determines Change:  
First proof:  Second proof:  
[(𝛽0+𝛽1+𝛽2+𝛿)-(𝛽0+𝛽1)] - [(𝛽0+𝛽2)-(𝛽0)] [(𝛽0+𝛽1+𝛽2+𝛿)-(𝛽0+𝛽2)] - [(𝛽0+𝛽1)-(𝛽0)] 
= [𝛽0-𝛽0+𝛽1-𝛽1+𝛽2+𝛿] - [𝛽0-𝛽0+𝛽2] = [𝛽0-𝛽0+𝛽1+𝛽2-𝛽2+𝛿] - [𝛽0-𝛽0+𝛽1] 
= [𝛽2+𝛿-𝛽2] = [𝛽2-𝛽2+𝛿] = [𝛽1+𝛿-𝛽1] = [𝛽1-𝛽1+𝛿] 





8.2 Control regressions  
Explanation of the variables:  
𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 = A numerical variable, indicating what year the observation represents. Stretching 
from 2013-2021. Since we use 𝛿 as our 𝛽3 value, 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 will be noted with 𝛽4. 
𝑻𝑶𝑷𝟑𝟎𝑸𝑩 = Dummy variable. Created new sample only including the top 30 percent of 
QBs. (𝑇𝑂𝑃30𝑄𝐵 = 1 for the top 30 percent of the Treatment group, 𝑇𝑂𝑃30𝑄𝐵 = 0 for the 
Control group) 
𝑻𝑶𝑷𝟓𝑸𝑩 = Dummy variable. Created new sample only including the top five percent of 
QBs. (𝑇𝑂𝑃5𝑄𝐵 = 1 for the top five percent of the Treatment group, 𝑇𝑂𝑃5𝑄𝐵 = 0 for the 
Control group) 
𝑹𝑰𝟏𝟕 = Dummy variable. Indicating whether we are before or after the false intervention in 
2017. (𝑅𝐼17 = 1 after, 𝑅𝐼17 = 0 before). 
𝑹𝑰𝟏𝟗 = Dummy variable. Indicating whether we are before or after false intervention in 
2019. (𝑅𝐼19 = 1 after, 𝑅𝐼19 = 0 before). 
The five regressions:  
Cap Number:  
𝒀𝑪𝒂𝒑𝑵𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑄𝐵 +  𝛽2𝑅𝐼 + 𝛿(𝑄𝐵 ∗ 𝑅𝐼) + 𝛽4𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜖 (5) 
𝒀𝑪𝒂𝒑𝑵𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑂𝑃30𝑄𝐵 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐼 + 𝛿(𝑇𝑂𝑃30𝑄𝐵 ∗ 𝑅𝐼) + 𝜖 (6) 
𝒀𝑪𝒂𝒑𝑵𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑂𝑃5𝑄𝐵 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐼 + 𝛿(𝑇𝑂𝑃5𝑄𝐵 ∗ 𝑅𝐼) + 𝜖 (7) 
𝒀𝑪𝒂𝒑𝑵𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑄𝐵 +  𝛽2𝑅𝐼17 + 𝛿(𝑄𝐵 ∗ 𝑅𝐼17) + 𝜖 (8) 
𝒀𝑪𝒂𝒑𝑵𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑄𝐵 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐼19 +  𝛿(𝑄𝐵 ∗ 𝑅𝐼19) + 𝜖 (9) 
 
Cash Spent:  
𝒀𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒉𝑺𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒕 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑄𝐵 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐼 + 𝛿(𝑄𝐵 ∗ 𝑅𝐼) + 𝛽4𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜖 (10) 
𝒀𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒉𝑺𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒕 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑂𝑃30𝑄𝐵 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐼 + 𝛿(𝑇𝑂𝑃30𝑄𝐵 ∗ 𝑅𝐼) + 𝜖 (11) 
𝒀𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒉𝑺𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒕 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑂𝑃5𝑄𝐵 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐼 + 𝛿(𝑇𝑂𝑃5𝑄𝐵 ∗ 𝑅𝐼) + 𝜖 (12) 
𝒀𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒉𝑺𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒕 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑄𝐵 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐼17 + 𝛿(𝑄𝐵 ∗ 𝑅𝐼17) + 𝜖 (13) 






8.3 R-codes  
 









# DID-estimation, using player specific data 
# Cleaning the environment  
rm(list=ls()) 
 
# In the scrape section later on,  
# you will see that we saved the finished  
# data set to our system.  
# However, we wanted it to be easier for you  
# to extract the data,  
# so here is an exact replica of our data-set:  
nfltotal<-read_csv("https://raw.githubusercontent.com/thojak14/Maste
rThesis-/main/NFLPS.csv") 
nfltotal$X1 <- NULL 
 
# Creating the dummy called "rule_implemented" 
nfltotal$rule_implemented=ifelse(nfltotal$year>=2018,1,0) 
 
# Correlation  
cncorr<-cor.test(nfltotal$qb,nfltotal$cap_number,  
                    method = "pearson") 
cncorr # 0.18<0.29=low degree of correlation  
 
cscorr<-cor.test(nfltotal$qb,nfltotal$cash_spent, 
                   method = "pearson") 
cscorr #0.17<0.29=low degree of correlation  
 
# Descriptive statistics  
nfltotaldataframe <- data.frame(nfltotal) 
stargazer(nfltotaldataframe, digits=0, 
          summary.stat=c("n","mean","sd","max"),  
          keep=c("cap_number","cash_spent", 
                 "salary_cap"), 
          covariate.labels=c("Cap Number","Cash Spent", 
                             "Salary Cap"), 
          title="Descriptive Statistics",type="html",out="DS.doc")  
# Creating a time trend of the raw data.  




# to both Cap Number and Cash Spent. This is done  
# for both the Treatment group and the Control group.  
 
# Treatment group  
qb2013 <- nfltotal %>% filter(qb==1) %>% filter(year==2013) 
qb2014 <- nfltotal %>% filter(qb==1) %>% filter(year==2014) 
qb2015 <- nfltotal %>% filter(qb==1) %>% filter(year==2015) 
qb2016 <- nfltotal %>% filter(qb==1) %>% filter(year==2016) 
qb2017 <- nfltotal %>% filter(qb==1) %>% filter(year==2017) 
qb2018 <- nfltotal %>% filter(qb==1) %>% filter(year==2018) 
qb2019 <- nfltotal %>% filter(qb==1) %>% filter(year==2019) 
qb2020 <- nfltotal %>% filter(qb==1) %>% filter(year==2020) 
qb2021 <- nfltotal %>% filter(qb==1) %>% filter(year==2021) 
 
# Control group  
nonqb2013 <- nfltotal %>% filter(qb==0) %>% filter(year==2013) 
nonqb2014 <- nfltotal %>% filter(qb==0) %>% filter(year==2014) 
nonqb2015 <- nfltotal %>% filter(qb==0) %>% filter(year==2015) 
nonqb2016 <- nfltotal %>% filter(qb==0) %>% filter(year==2016) 
nonqb2017 <- nfltotal %>% filter(qb==0) %>% filter(year==2017) 
nonqb2018 <- nfltotal %>% filter(qb==0) %>% filter(year==2018) 
nonqb2019 <- nfltotal %>% filter(qb==0) %>% filter(year==2019) 
nonqb2020 <- nfltotal %>% filter(qb==0) %>% filter(year==2020) 
nonqb2021 <- nfltotal %>% filter(qb==0) %>% filter(year==2021) 
 
# Creating data frame of mean values for Cap Number  
# Treatment group  
cnmeanqb <- data.frame(mean(qb2013$cap_number), 
                       mean(qb2014$cap_number), 
                       mean(qb2015$cap_number), 
                       mean(qb2016$cap_number), 
                       mean(qb2017$cap_number), 
                       mean(qb2018$cap_number), 
                       mean(qb2019$cap_number), 
                       mean(qb2020$cap_number), 
                       mean(qb2021$cap_number)) 
 
# Control group  
cnmeannonqb <- data.frame(mean(nonqb2013$cap_number), 
                          mean(nonqb2014$cap_number), 
                          mean(nonqb2015$cap_number), 
                          mean(nonqb2016$cap_number), 
                          mean(nonqb2017$cap_number), 
                          mean(nonqb2018$cap_number), 
                          mean(nonqb2019$cap_number), 
                          mean(nonqb2020$cap_number), 
                          mean(nonqb2021$cap_number)) 
 




csmeanqb <- data.frame(mean(qb2013$cash_spent), 
                       mean(qb2014$cash_spent), 
                       mean(qb2015$cash_spent), 
                       mean(qb2016$cash_spent), 
                       mean(qb2017$cash_spent), 
                       mean(qb2018$cash_spent), 
                       mean(qb2019$cash_spent), 
                       mean(qb2020$cash_spent), 
                       mean(qb2021$cash_spent)) 
 
# Control group  
csmeannonqb <- data.frame(mean(nonqb2013$cash_spent), 
                          mean(nonqb2014$cash_spent), 
                          mean(nonqb2015$cash_spent), 
                          mean(nonqb2016$cash_spent), 
                          mean(nonqb2017$cash_spent), 
                          mean(nonqb2018$cash_spent), 
                          mean(nonqb2019$cash_spent), 
                          mean(nonqb2020$cash_spent), 
                          mean(nonqb2021$cash_spent)) 
 
# Transpose to easier plot the results  
cnmeanqb <- t(cnmeanqb) 
cnmeannonqb <- t(cnmeannonqb) 
csmeanqb <- t(csmeanqb) 
csmeannonqb <- t(csmeannonqb) 
 
# Plot  
plot(cnmeanqb/1000000,xaxt="n",ylim=c(0,7), 
     main="Time trend Treatment group", 




     main="Time trend Control group", 




     main="Time trend Treatment group", 




     main="Time trend Control group", 





# Estimating DID using our regressions  
didqbcn <- lm(cap_number~qb+rule_implemented+ 
                qb*rule_implemented, data=nfltotal) 
didcsqb <- lm(cash_spent~qb+rule_implemented+ 
                qb*rule_implemented, data=nfltotal) 
 
# Results  
summary(didqbcn) # delta-coefficient=897,399  
summary(didcsqb) # delta-coefficient=1,208,367   
 
# Creating table for the article  
stargazer(didqbcn,didcsqb, digits=0, 
          dep.var.labels=c("Cap Number","Cash Spent"), 
          covariate.labels=c("QB","RI","QB*RI"),  
          keep.stat=c("n","adj.rsq","f"),  
          title="DID",type="html",out="DID.doc") 
 
# Creating before treatment, after treatment,  
# before control and after control data sets. 
treatafter <- nfltotal %>% filter(qb==1) %>%  
  filter(rule_implemented==1) 
treatbefore <- nfltotal %>% filter(qb==1) %>%  
  filter(rule_implemented==0) 
controlafter <- nfltotal %>% filter(qb==0) %>%  
  filter(rule_implemented==1) 
controlbefore <- nfltotal %>% filter(qb==0) %>%  
  filter(rule_implemented==0) 
 
# Creating data frames consisting  
# of mean values.   
didcn <- data.frame(mean(treatafter$cap_number), 
                    mean(treatbefore$cap_number),  
                    mean(controlafter$cap_number), 
                    mean(controlbefore$cap_number)) 
didcs <- data.frame(mean(treatafter$cash_spent), 
                    mean(treatbefore$cash_spent),  
                    mean(controlafter$cash_spent), 
                    mean(controlbefore$cash_spent)) 
 
# Finding the delta using mean values  
round((didcn[1]-didcn[3])-(didcn[2]-didcn[4]),0) ->  
  DeltaCN # 897,399  
round((didcs[1]-didcs[3])-(didcs[2]-didcs[4]),0) ->  
  DeltaCS  # 1,208,367   
 
# Adding the delta to mean values 
meanvaluescn <- cbind(didcn,DeltaCN) 





# Giving the values new names 
names(meanvaluescn)[1:5] <- c("Treatment After","Treatment Before", 
                              "Control After","Control After","Delta
") 
names(meanvaluescs)[1:5] <- c("Treatment After","Treatment Before", 
                              "Control After","Control After","Delta
") 
 
# Creating tables for article  
stargazer(meanvaluescn,digits=0, 
          summary.stat="mean",out="MeanCN.doc", 
          title="Mean values Cap Number",type="html") 
stargazer(meanvaluescs,digits=0, 
          summary.stat="mean",out="MeanCS.doc", 
          title="Mean values Cash Spent",type="html") 
# Creating plot for DID. 
# Note: The following code was more or less copied from "Chapter 7"  
# in Principles of Econometrics (R.Carter Hill * William E. Griffith
s * Guay C.Lim). 
# Only numbers concerning our research was put in place of the code 
copied from Chapter 7. 
# We also chose to devide the numbers with 1 million.  
# This because we wanted to show DID in millions of dollars.  
 
# Cap number.   
b0 <- coef(didqbcn)[1]/1000000 
b1 <- coef(didqbcn)[2]/1000000 
b2 <- coef(didqbcn)[3]/1000000 
delta <- coef(didqbcn)[4]/1000000 
 
# Creating TA,CA,TB,CB,CTA   
TA <- b0+b1+b2+delta  
CA <- b0+b2  
TB <- b0+b1  
CB <- b0  
CTA <- CA+(TB-CB)     
 
# Plot.  
# Note: The whole section needs to be run at the same time.  
plot(1,type="n",xlab="Intervention",ylab="Cap Number",  
     xaxt="n",xlim=c(-0.01,1.01),ylim=c(1.5, 6), 





       legend=c("Control","Treatment",  










# Hence we have proved that:  
round(((TA-CTA)*1000000),0) # delta-coefficient=897,399   
# Cash spent.  
b0 <- coef(didcsqb)[1]/1000000 
b1 <- coef(didcsqb)[2]/1000000 
b2 <- coef(didcsqb)[3]/1000000 
delta <- coef(didcsqb)[4]/1000000 
 
# Creating TA,CA,TB,CB,CTA  
TA <- b0+b1+b2+delta 
CA <- b0+b2 
TB <- b0+b1 
CB <- b0 




     xaxt="n",xlim=c(-0.01,1.01),ylim=c(1.5,6.5), 





                          "Counterfactual Treatment"), 






# Hence we have proved that:  
round(((TA-CTA)*1000000),0)# delta-coefficient=1,208,367   
# DID with time trend included  
didtimecn <- lm(cap_number~qb+rule_implemented+ 
                  qb*rule_implemented+year, data=nfltotal) 
didtimecs <- lm(cash_spent~qb+rule_implemented+ 
                  qb*rule_implemented+year, data=nfltotal) 
 






# DID with Robustness checks 
 




# Estimating DID  
didcnqb17 <- lm(cap_number~qb+rule_implemented17+ 
                  qb*rule_implemented17,data=nfltotal) 
didcsqb17 <- lm(cash_spent~qb+rule_implemented17+ 
                  qb*rule_implemented17,data=nfltotal) 
didcnqb19 <- lm(cap_number~qb+rule_implemented19+ 
                  qb*rule_implemented19, data=nfltotal) 
didcsqb19 <- lm(cash_spent~qb+rule_implemented+ 
                  qb*rule_implemented19, data=nfltotal) 
 





# Estimating DID for the top percentage  
# of QBs.  
 
# Creating subsets for QBs and non QBs 
nfltotalqb <- subset(nfltotal, qb==1) 
nfltotalnonqb <- subset(nfltotal, qb==0) 
 
# Creating a decending order for all players 
nfltotal[rev(order(nfltotal$cap_number)),] %>%  
  head(21372) -> nfltotaltopcn 
nfltotal[rev(order(nfltotal$cash_spent)),] %>%  
  head(21372) -> nfltotaltopcs 
 
# Then, creating a descending order for QBs 
nfltotalqb[rev(order(nfltotalqb$cap_number)),] %>%  
  head(954) -> top_cap_number_qb 
nfltotalqb[rev(order(nfltotalqb$cash_spent)),] %>%  
  head(954) -> top_cash_spent_qb  
 
# 30 % = approximately the top 286 observations  
nfltotalqb[rev(order(nfltotalqb$cap_number)),] %>%  
  head(286) -> top_cap_number_qb_30  
nfltotalqb[rev(order(nfltotalqb$cash_spent)),] %>%  
  head(286) -> top_cash_spent_qb_30 
 
# 5 % = approximately the top 47 observations  




  head(47) -> top_cap_number_qb_5  
nfltotalqb[rev(order(nfltotalqb$cash_spent)),] %>%  
  head(47) -> top_cash_spent_qb_5 
 
# Creating different datasets  
# One for top 30 % of QBs and all the others,  
# And one for top 5 % of QBs and all the others.  
nfltotalcn30 <- rbind(nfltotalnonqb,top_cap_number_qb_30) 
nfltotalcs30 <- rbind(nfltotalnonqb,top_cash_spent_qb_30) 
nfltotalcn5 <- rbind(nfltotalnonqb,top_cap_number_qb_5) 
nfltotalcs5 <- rbind(nfltotalnonqb,top_cash_spent_qb_5) 
 
# DID top 30 percent of QBs  
didtop30cn <- lm(cap_number~qb+rule_implemented+ 
                   qb*rule_implemented, data=nfltotalcn30) 
didtop30cs <- lm(cash_spent~qb+rule_implemented+ 
                   qb*rule_implemented, data=nfltotalcs30) 
 
# DID top five percent of QBs 
didtop5cn <- lm(cap_number~qb+rule_implemented+ 
                  qb*rule_implemented, data=nfltotalcn5) 
didtop5cs <- lm(cash_spent~qb+rule_implemented+ 
                  qb*rule_implemented, data=nfltotalcs5) 
 





# Now that we have created subsets consisting of  
# the top 30 and five percent of QBs,  
# we are able to plot graphs for the article.  
 
# Plot all players  
plot(nfltotaltopcn$cap_number/1000000, 
     main="Projected distribution of money for all players", 
     xlab="Players", 
     ylab="Cap Number") 
plot(nfltotaltopcs$cash_spent/1000000, 
     main="Actual distribution of money for all players", 
     xlab="Players", 
     ylab="Cash Spent") 
 
# Plot all QBs  
plot(top_cap_number_qb$cap_number/1000000, 
     main="Projected distribution of money for QBs", 
     xlab="QBs", 





     main="Actual distribution of money for QBs",  
     xlab="QBs", 
     ylab="Cash Spent") 
 
# Plot top 30 percent of QBs 
plot(top_cap_number_qb_30$cap_number/1000000, 
     main="Projected distribution of money for top 30 percent of QBs
",  
     xlab="QBs",  
     ylab="Cap Number") 
plot(top_cash_spent_qb_30$cash_spent/1000000, 
     main="Actual distribution of money for top 30 percent of QBs", 
     xlab="QBs", 
     ylab="Cash Spent")  
 
# Plot top 5 percent of QBs  
plot(top_cap_number_qb_5$cap_number/1000000, 
     main="Projected distribution of money for top five percent of Q
Bs",  
     xlab="QBs",  
     ylab="Cap Number") 
plot(top_cash_spent_qb_5$cash_spent/1000000,  
     main="Actual distribution of money for top five percent of QBs"
,  
     xlab="QBs", 
     ylab="Cash Spent") 
# Creating two tables that consists of 
# Control for time trends,  
# Robustness checks and  
# Top 30 and five percent of QBs.   
# One for Cap Number and one for  
# Cash Spent.  
# We omit "year" as we are only interested in the  
# interaction variable between "qb" and "rule implemented",  
# the interaction between "qb30" & "qb5" and "rule implemented  
# and the interaction between "qb" and "rule implemented 17" &  
# "rule implemented 19".  
 
 
# Cap Number  
stargazer(didtimecn,didtop30cn,didtop5cn, 
          didcnqb17,didcnqb19, digits=0, 
          dep.var.labels= "Cap Number", 
          covariate.labels = c("QB","RI","QB*RI","RI17", 
                               "QB*RI17","R-I19","QB*RI19"), 
          keep.stat="n", 





# Cash Spent 
stargazer(didtimecs,didtop30cs,didtop5cs, 
          didcsqb17,didcsqb19, digits=0, 
          dep.var.labels = "Cash Spent", 
          covariate.labels = c("QB","RI","QB*RI","RI17", 
                               "QB*RI17","RI19","QB*RI19"), 
          keep.stat="n", 
          type="html",out="cashspent.doc",omit="year") 
# Scrape for player specific data 
# Note: Scraping player specific data consisted of scraping  
# each position for each year. However, in this Appendix  
# we will only include the scrape for the data  
# concerning 2021.  
 







# Cleaning the environment 
rm(list=ls()) 
 
# First, scraping information about each position.   
# Then, cleaning the column names, so we do not use capital letters. 
# Last, we create a variable for "year" and a dummy for QB.  
 
# 2021  
 




qb2021 <- qb2021[[1]]  
qb2021 <- qb2021 %>% clean_names() 
qb2021$year <-(2021)  
qb2021$qb <- (1) 
rb2021 <- read_html("https://overthecap.com/position/running-back/20
21/")  
%>% html_table(fill=TRUE)  
rb2021 <- rb2021[[1]] 
rb2021$year <-(2021) 








fb2021 <- fb2021[[1]] 
fb2021$year <-(2021) 





wr2021 <- wr2021[[1]] 
wr2021$year <-(2021) 





te2021 <- te2021[[1]]  
te2021$year <-(2021) 





lt2021 <- lt2021[[1]] 
lt2021$year <-(2021) 





lg2021 <- lg2021[[1]] 
lg2021$year <-(2021) 
lg2021 <- lg2021 %>% clean_names() 
lg2021$qb <-(0) 
ce2021 <- read_html("https://overthecap.com/position/center/2021/")  
%>% html_table(fill=TRUE) 
ce2021 <- ce2021[[1]] 
ce2021$year <-(2021) 





rg2021 <- rg2021[[1]] 
rg2021$year <-(2021) 








rt2021 <- rt2021[[1]] 
rt2021$year <-(2021) 
rt2021 <-rt2021 %>% clean_names() 
rt2021$qb <-(0) 
 




idl2021 <- idl2021[[1]] 
idl2021$year <-(2021) 





ed2021 <- ed2021[[1]] 
ed2021$year <-(2021) 





lb2021 <- lb2021[[1]]  
lb2021$year <-(2021) 
lb2021 <- lb2021 %>% clean_names() 
lb2021$qb <-(0) 
sa2021 <- read_html("https://overthecap.com/position/safety/2021/") 
%>% html_table(fill=TRUE) 
sa2021 <- sa2021[[1]] 
sa2021$year <-(2021) 





cb2021 <- cb2021[[1]]  
cb2021$year <-(2021) 
cb2021 <- cb2021 %>% clean_names() 
cb2021$qb <-(0) 
 
# Special teams 
ki2021 <- read_html("https://overthecap.com/position/kicker/2021/")  
%>% html_table(fill=TRUE) 
ki2021 <- ki2021[[1]]  
ki2021$year <- (2021) 
ki2021 <- ki2021 %>% clean_names() 
ki2021$qb <-(0) 





pu2021 <- pu2021[[1]] 
pu2021$year <-(2021) 





ls2021 <- ls2021[[1]] 
ls2021$year <-(2021) 
ls2021 <- ls2021 %>% clean_names() 
ls2021$qb <-(0) 
 
# Creating a new data frame consisting of all the positions   
players2021 <- rbind(qb2021,cb2021,ce2021,ed2021,fb2021, 
                     idl2021,ki2021,lb2021,lg2021,ls2021, 
                     lt2021,pu2021,rb2021,rg2021,rt2021, 
                     sa2021,te2021,wr2021) 
 
# Removing dollar signs and commas from cap_number and cash_spent  
players2021[] <- lapply(players2021,gsub,pattern="$", 
                        fixed=TRUE,replacement="") 
players2021[] <- lapply(players2021,gsub,pattern=",", 
                        fixed=TRUE,replacement="") 
 
# Saving the data  
save(players2021, file="players2021") 











# Creating a column for salary-cap for each year, which will be our 
dependent variable  
 
# 2013,  
# https://www.nfl.com/news/nfl-sets-2013-salary-cap-at-123m-up-from-
120-6m-0ap1000000146046 
players2013$salary_cap <- (123000000) 
players2013 <- players2013 %>%  






# 2014,  
# https://www.nfl.com/news/nfl-salary-cap-makes-nearly-10m-jump-to-1
33-million-0ap2000000329753 
players2014$salary_cap <- (133000000) 
players2014 <- players2014 %>%  
  mutate_at(c(3:7), as.numeric) 
str(players2014) 
 
# 2015,  
# https://www.nfl.com/news/nfl-salary-cap-will-be-143-28-million-in-
2015-0ap3000000475775 
players2015$salary_cap <- (143280000) 
players2015 <- players2015 %>%  
  mutate_at(c(3:7), as.numeric) 
str(players2015) 
 
# 2016,  
# https://nflpa.com/press/2016-adjusted-team-salary-caps 
# Each team has individual, but using a league wide cap seems sufici
ent  
players2016$salary_cap <- (155270000) 
players2016 <- players2016 %>%  
  mutate_at(c(3:7), as.numeric) 
str(players2016) 
 
# 2017,  
# Reported to be 167.million  
players2017$salary_cap <- (167000000) 
players2017 <- players2017 %>%  
  mutate_at(c(3:7), as.numeric) 
str(players2017) 
 
# 2018,  
# Reported to be 177,2 million  
players2018$salary_cap <- (177200000) 
players2018 <- players2018 %>%  




# Reported to be 188,2 million  
players2019$salary_cap <- (188200000) 
players2019 <- players2019 %>%  
  mutate_at(c(3:7), as.numeric) 
str(players2019) 
 






players2020$salary_cap <- (198200000) 
players2020 <- players2020 %>%  




# 2021,  
# https://www.nfl.com/news/nfl-2021-salary-cap-182-5-million 
players2021$salary_cap <- (182500000) 
players2021 <- players2021 %>%  
  mutate_at(c(3:7), as.numeric) 
str(players2021) 
 
# Creating new data frame 
nfltotal <- rbind(players2013,players2014,players2015,players2016,pl
ayers2017, 
                  players2018,players2019,players2020,players2021) 
 
# Saving the data frame, and then loading it again when estimating  
save(nfltotal, file="NFLPS") 
 
# Date for final scrape: 13th of April 2021, 13.00 PM. 
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